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When Does Leverage Hurt Performance?  
A Firm-Level Analysis 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis has revived interest in the risks of excessive credit expansion at the 
macroeconomic level. In a recent paper titled “Too much finance”, Arcand et al. (2011) identify a 
threshold level of domestic credit to the economy beyond which output growth begins to fall. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) identify a similarly non-monotonic relationship between public debt 
and growth. In this paper we argue that there can be too much finance at the firm level. Using 
insights from the macroeconomic and corporate finance literatures, we identify a non-monotonic 
relationship between leverage and firm-level productivity growth.  
Corporate leverage decisions are among the most important decisions made by firm executives and 
have been the focus of intense scrutiny since Modigliani and Miller (1958). Financial conditions in 
the corporate sector not only affect firm performance but, as macroeconomists have long 
recognized, they can have a powerful effect on macroeconomic outcomes. The literature on 
“financial accelerators” is concerned with the role of financial conditions in amplifying shocks to the 
economy (see e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999)) while the literature on the finance-growth nexus (e.g., 
see Ang (2008) for a recent survey) is concerned with their contribution to long-term growth. The 
present paper aims to provide a first attempt at bridging the gap between the literature on optimal 
capital structure and the macroeconomic literature on finance-growth linkages. We use threshold 
regressions to investigate the non-monotonic relationship between leverage and several indices of 
firm performance, and the extent to which this relationship varies across types of firms.  
Among all possible measures of firm performance, our analysis particularly focuses on total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth for several reasons. Productivity growth is generally considered to be 
the main driver of growth at the macroeconomic level. A number of studies have demonstrated that 
TFP growth is more important for income growth than other factors such as capital accumulation, 
and that TFP differences explain more of the variation in cross-country per capita GDP than 
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variables like human capital, physical capital or trade1. Productivity has also been used to gauge firm 
performance in the corporate finance literature [e.g. Schoar (2002), Maksimovic and Phillips 
(2002), McGuckin and Nguyen (1995), Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2011)], the management 
accounting literature [Kaplan (1983)], and the literature on corporate control [Köke and 
Renneboog (2005)]. It is an important determinant of how firms react to business cycle 
fluctuations. In the framework of Imrohoroglu and Tüzel (2011), low TFP firms are more 
vulnerable to business cycles and hence are riskier than firms with high TFP. Low TFP firms have a 
higher implied cost of capital (ICC) and both the levels of ICC and the ICC spread between low and 
high TFP firms are countercyclical. Several papers find that productivity is positively related to firm 
value2. Intuitively, productivity growth results in the efficient use of the firm’s resources, which 
allows the firm to reduce its output prices while maintaining or increasing profit margins. In the 
long-run, productivity growth enables the firm to remain profitable and survive, which enhances 
shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, our starting point to understand the link between leverage and 
productivity growth is the finance literature that relates leverage to firm value. In particular, our 
hypothesis is inspired by the trade-off theory of optimal capital structure, which explains firms’ 
choice of leverage by a trade-off between the benefits and costs of debt. The second most influential 
theory of corporate leverage is the pecking-order theory due to Myers (1984). Therefore, 
identifying the non-monotonic effects of leverage on productivity gains is relevant both from the 
perspective of capital structure theory and the macroeconomic perspective of long-term growth 
and business cycle fluctuations.   
We focus on the trade-off theory rather than the pecking order theory for various reasons. From a 
policy perspective, it is important to identify firms or sectors where leverage may be excessive. 
Excessiveness must be defined with respect to an optimal capital structure. However, there is no 
optimal debt ratio in the pecking order theory in the sense that firms do not aim at a particular 
target debt ratio. Instead, the theory suggests that observed leverage is the cumulative result of 
hierarchical financing decisions over time (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999)). In addition, the US 
empirical evidence is not very supportive of the pecking order theory [See for example Fama and 
French (2002a) and Frank and Goyal (2003)]. In a recent comprehensive review of the literature, 
                                                 
1 See for example Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2001), and Henry 
et al (2009). 
2 See for example Bao and Bao (1989), Riahi-Belkaoui (1999), Dwyer (2001), and Balasubramanyan and Mohan (2010). 
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Frank and Goyal (2009) conclude that the empirical evidence is rather consistent with some 
versions of the trade-off theory. This does not imply that the pecking order theory is irrelevant in 
our sample and we do not attempt to test it. The trade-off theory is simply the most natural starting 
point for a study of “excessive” indebtedness. 
 
The trade-off hypothesis (right word?) goes back to Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) who weigh 
bankruptcy costs against the benefits of interest tax shields. The benefits of debt also include the 
mitigation of agency problems. In particular, debt has a disciplining role due to the associated 
reduction in free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). The costs of debt include debt overhang (Myers 
(1977)), risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling (1976)), bankruptcy costs (Warner (1977)), and asset 
fire sales (Schleifer and Vishny (1992)). Trade-off theory predicts that net benefits to debt financing 
rise for companies with low debt but decrease as leverage becomes high, implying that net benefits 
are a non-monotonic function of leverage. The empirical literature tests this hypothesis (against the 
competing pecking order theory) by typically running cross-sectional or panel regressions of 
leverage on various firm-level, industry-level and market characteristics that determine optimal 
leverage3. While the literature has explored the relationship between leverage and firm value or 
performance (e.g., McConnell and Servaes (1995); Berger and di Patti (2006); Driffield, 
Mahambare and Pal (2007)), it has remained silent on the relationship between leverage and 
productivity. With both benefits and costs to leverage, we posit a hump-shaped relationship 
between leverage and productivity growth at the firm level4. At low levels of leverage, higher 
leverage is likely to be associated with higher TFP growth as the benefits to leverage outweigh the 
costs and debt is used to finance productive investment. As leverage increases, the costs of debt 
become larger and erode the net benefits to leverage. Highly-levered firms not only suffer from a 
debt overhang problem, which reduces their incentives to invest in productive investment, their 
attention is also diverted from productivity improvements by the need to generate cash flow in 
order to service their debts. While our hypothesis is clearly inspired by the trade-off theory, its 
testing does not constitute a test this. Trade-off theory relates the cost of capital of the firm (or its 
market value) to its market-value-based debt-to-equity ratio. In this paper, we relate TFP growth 
                                                 
3  See Frank and Goyal (2009) for a review of the literature. 
4 A similar relationship can be posited between leverage and any index of firm value. While our focus is on TFP 
growth, we also provide evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between leverage and two proxies for firm value, 
namely return on assets and return on equity (see section 3). 
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to the book value of leverage. The use of book values is dictated by the lack of market data for our 
sample countries where equity markets remain rather underdeveloped. 
 
Our sample consists of Central and Eastern European countries. Transition economies are an 
interesting sample for several reasons. First, the transition experience has long been described as a 
“natural experiment” (see for example, Eicher and Schreiber (2010)). While transition countries 
started the transition process from similar (though not identical) positions in terms of liberalisation, 
institutional reform has progressed in varying ways and to different degrees. Even after more than a 
decade of financial sector reforms, there is a growing feeling that the latter have failed to spur 
adequately the development of corporate financing opportunities. There is a striking proportion of 
firms in our sample with zero outstanding debt, including both short- and long-term debt. The 
“mystery of zero-leverage firms” (Strebulaev and Yang (2006)) is very pronounced in transition 
countries. Second, this puzzle is augmented by another one: among those firms with outstanding 
debt, many tend to have very high, potentially excessive leverage. Unlike much of the literature on 
developed countries, the literature on capital structure in developing and transition countries has 
highlighted the importance of excessive leverage (e.g. see Driffield and Pal (2010)). Many CEE 
countries have experienced rapid credit growth in recent years, in particular the Baltic States, 
Southern Eastern Europe and Ukraine. While the benefits of rapid credit growth have been 
recognized, the risks related to credit booms have been highlighted by the recent financial crisis, 
which has severely hit many CEE countries. Assessing the sustainability of firm-level credit growth 
and developing appropriate policy tools remains one of the priorities of policymakers and 
international organizations active in this region. In addition, the continued practice of soft budget 
constraints in this region may contribute to the negative impact of excessive leverage on TFP 
growth5 in our sample. Soft budget constraints (SBCs) imply that government or financial 
institutions are willing to provide additional financing to firms with negative NPV projects (see e.g. 
Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)). If firms take advantage of SBCs, borrowed funds may be used 
inefficiently rather than for productive investment. Research has indeed shown that one of the 
detrimental impacts of SBCs on the economy is a lack of R&D (Kornai (2001) and Brücker et al. 
(2005)). 
                                                 
5 Konings et al. (2003) for example demonstrate that soft budget constraints remain into later stages of transition. 
(e.g.)). 
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Our estimates confirm that TFP growth increases with leverage until the latter reaches a critical 
threshold beyond which leverage becomes “excessive” and lowers TFP growth. We confirm the 
robustness of this result by estimating an alternative threshold model using lagged leverage. All the 
results point to the existence of an optimal leverage ratio where the net benefits of debt in terms of 
productivity gains are exhausted. Our paper reaches some qualitatively similar conclusions to 
Korteweg (2010). Using a different methodology and a market-based assessment of the net benefits 
to leverage, the author finds that as leverage increases, net benefits to leverage first increase and 
then decrease, and finally turn negative for distressed firms. In addition, our analysis sheds light on 
how optimal leverage varies with firm characteristics, particularly profitability and size. Unlike 
existing studies that use traditional cross-sectional or panel regressions using observed leverage 
ratios6, the threshold model allows us to determine optimal leverage despite firms’ temporary 
deviations from the optimum. Again, we reach conclusions similar to those of Korteweg (2010).  
 
Since our conceptual starting point is the trade-off theory, we attempted to gauge its relevance in 
our sample. Data limitations permit only an indirect test of thetraditional trade-off theory. We 
employ two indices of firm value based on earnings (return on assets defined as EBIT to total assets 
and return on equity defined as EBIT to book value of equity) and related these to the book value of 
leverage using a threshold regression. While the exact values of the thresholds are somewhat 
higher, the qualitative results regarding the non-monotonic relationship described above hold when 
the dependent variable is a proxy for firm value rather than TFP growth (see further discussion in 
section 3). 
 
Finally, our paper also contributes to the burgeoning macro literature on the finance-growth nexus. 
Best practice in the recent literature on finance and growth uses industry-level data to overcome 
endogeneity problems typical of analyses that rely on aggregate data and identify the channel 
through which finance affects growth. In their seminal contribution, Rajan and Zingales (1998) find 
that industries that are relatively more dependent on external finance grow disproportionately 
faster in countries with more developed financial markets. Our paper provides an alternative firm-
level approach for studying the finance-growth nexus by directly linking firms’ financial structure to 
                                                 
6 See for example Korajczyk and Levy (2003). 
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TFP growth. In addition, our paper is related to the literature on the macroeconomic risks 
associated with lending booms. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) show how increases in corporate 
leverage lead to higher costs of external financing due to a higher default probability.  This could 
lower investment and therefore output. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et al. (1999) 
show how high indebtedness in the corporate sector can induce severe slowdowns by amplifying 
and propagating adverse shocks to the economy. Our analysis provides a tool to identify the point at 
which corporate sector indebtedness becomes a cause for concern. Indeed, whether a firm is below 
or above the threshold can be seen as a measure of “sustainability” of a firm’s leverage. The recent 
financial crisis has highlighted the risks of lending booms and the associated buildup of excessive 
indebtedness. Policy makers need to be able to assess the sustainability of leverage, both in order to 
prevent similar crises in the future and to identify those firms or sectors of the economy that need 
to go through a deleveraging process following a crisis.  The empirical literature on lending booms 
has generally focused on various aggregate measures of indebtedness such as various debt-to-GDP 
ratios (e.g. see Gourinchas et al. (2001)), or the growth rate of the domestic credit to GDP ratio as 
in the literature on banking and currency crises (e.g. see Kaminsky and Reinhart  (1999)). Our 
paper extends this literature by looking at the sustainability of credit at the firm level. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the data set and the 
variables used in the empirical analysis. In Section 3, we discuss the empirical methodology and 
present our results. Section 4 summarizes our main results and concludes.  
 
2. Data set and descriptive statistics 
 
2.1. Sample and sources 
 
The empirical test of our central hypothesis is based on firm-level data for a group of Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries. Data used for the analysis is primarily taken from Orbis, a rich 
firm-level dataset, which is provided by Bureau van Dijk electronic publishing. Firm-level data have 
been supplemented by country-level institutional data from the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD). Our sample consists of manufacturing firms from sixteen transition 
countries, namely, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
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Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, the Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine over the period 1999-2008. As can be seen from Figure 1, all these 
countries have on average experienced strong growth of domestic credit between 1998 and 2008. 
The effects of the Russian crisis, the bursting of the dotcom bubble and the financial crisis starting 
in 2007 visibly translated into a slowdown.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
2.2. Leverage measures and descriptive statistics 
 
Since we do not have data on market values for our sample firms, we consider two alternative 
definitions of book leverage: debt to total assets and total liabilities to total assets. These are 
accepted measures of leverage; especially in emerging markets where the size of equity markets is 
rather limited (e.g., see Booth et al. 2001; Driffield and Pal, 2010). First, we use the ratio of total 
debt (sum of long-term debt in non-current liabilities and loans included in current liabilities) to 
total assets (abbreviated as TDTA). Second, we use the ratio of total liabilities (sum of total current 
liabilities and total non-current liabilities) to total assets (abbreviated as TLTA)7. As can be seen 
from Table 1, there is a significant proportion of zero-leverage firms, without any outstanding debt, 
as well as a significant proportion of firms for which debt data is missing. This reflects the fact that 
many firms still do not have access to debt markets in these economies and instead make heavy use 
of internal finance, trade credit and other kinds of liabilities. Accordingly, the sample size is larger 
when leverage is measured by TLTA. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 shows the average leverage ratios for two subsamples, “all firms”, including zero-leverage 
firms, and “non-zero debt firms”, excluding zero-leverage firms. Among all firms, the average 
ratios of total liabilities to total assets range between 0.33 (Moldova) and 0.47 (Poland and 
Romania), while average debt ratios range between 0.05 (Romania) and 0.20 (Latvia and 
                                                 
7 Data on the book value of equity of our sample firms is limited.We use the book value of total assets rather than the 
book value of equity in order to maximize the sample size.  
9 
 
 
Lithuania). Among non-zero debt firms, the average debt ratios are unsurprisingly higher in all the 
sample countries, ranging from 0.12 in Romania to 0.25 in Latvia8. Table 2 shows the percentile 
distribution of debt ratios in each country. Debt ratios among the top 1% firms tend to be 
significantly higher than those for the median firms. Debt ratios for this group of firms exceed 50% 
in all but one country (Estonia). The maximum average leverage for this group is 89% in Croatia, 
closely followed by 85% in Latvia.  
 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 also summarizes the distribution of debt by firm size. We split the sample between “small” 
and “large” firms, where small firms are defined as those in the first two quartiles of the distribution 
of total assets. The correlation between firm size and the debt ratio is mostly positive, although it is 
quite small in some cases. A large positive correlation is found in Bulgaria, Croatia, Moldova, 
Serbia, which is in line with the US and international cross-sectional evidence that large firms tend 
to have higher leverage ratios than small firms9.  
 
As mentioned earlier, institutional reforms in the financial sector have progressed at varying speeds 
across countries in our sample. Table 3 summarizes the average values of the EBRD banking sector 
reform index and stock market capitalization to GDP for the period 1999-2008. The extent of 
stock market capitalization as a share of GDP is generally limited in most of the sample countries, 
especially in Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania and the Slovak Republic. Therefore, firms’ external 
financing opportunities may depend crucially on the size and efficiency of the banking sector. The 
extent of banking sector reforms varies widely across countries as can be seen from Table 3.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
A more efficient banking sector is better able to screen out bad loans while a better developed stock 
market not only offers an alternative source of external finance, but also contributes to improved 
corporate governance practices. Given the variation in the extent of institutional reforms across our 
                                                 
8 We have also experimented with alternative leverage measures, namely, debt and liability ratios net of cash-flow, 
which yield comparable results to those presented here. 
9 See for example Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
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sample countries, it may be important to control for the quality of financial institutions when 
assessing the effect of leverage on TFP growth.  
 
3. Empirical model of leverage and productivity growth  
 
We use the threshold regression framework of Hansen (2000) in order to test the hypothesis of a 
non-monotonic relationship between leverage and productivity growth10. In our attempt to bridge 
the gap between the trade-off theory and the finance-growth theory, we also examine if a similar 
non-monotonic relationship exists between leverage and selected measures of firm value. In the 
absence of data on the market value of our sample firms, the analysis relies on two earnings-based 
proxies of firm value, namely earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as a share of total assets and 
as a share of book value of equity. We examine the robustness of our estimates in several ways. 
First, we address the potential simultaneity between leverage and TFP growth by “instrumenting” 
leverage with lagged leverage and the predicted values of leverage based on firm characteristics. 
Second, we examine the relationship between the identified threshold and firm characteristics, 
namely profitability and size. Finally, we estimate our model on the 2000-2006 subsample. 
 
 
3.1. Total factor productivity estimates 
 
TFP estimates are generated using the well-known Levinsohn-Petrin method (Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003)). This method allows us to address a potential endogeneity problem which arises because 
firms anticipate shocks to productivity and accordingly adjust inputs throughout the production 
process. Appendix 1 explains how the Levinsohn-Petrin method addresses this problem.  
 
3.2. A threshold regression model 
 
The current approach to threshold analysis was pioneered by Hansen (2000). The method 
                                                 
10 In order to identify the non-monotonic effects of leverage on total factor productivity growth, one could use a fixed-
effects regression of total factor productivity growth on leverage and its non-linear terms, after controlling for other 
covariates. However this conventional method does not allow one to endogenously determine the existence and 
significance of a threshold beyond which TFP growth is negatively affected by further increases in debt.  
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endogenously determines the existence and significance of one or more thresholds that split the 
sample into “regimes”, and allows the regression coefficients on the threshold variable to vary 
depending on the regime. In particular, we endogenously identify three regimes of leverage (low, 
intermediate and high) and show that leverage has a different impact on TFP growth depending on 
the regime. This method allows us to obtain a direct estimate of optimal leverage while allowing for 
firm’s temporary deviations from the optimum. Denoting the leverage of the i-th firm in year t by 
Lit, the simplest threshold model of TFP growth for the period [t, t+1] is given by 
  
ΔTFPit+1 = α1 Lit + β’Xit+ νit  if  Lit ≤γ                                     (3a) 
ΔTFPit+1 = α2 Lit + β’Xit+ νit  if  Lit >γ                                       (3b) 
 
where νit is an error term and   is the threshold parameter to be estimated. Xit is a set of lagged 
explanatory variables, including: firm size (dummy for small and medium firms that includes firms 
in the first two quartiles of total assets), age (dummy for young firms established in or after 1995), 
the share of intangible assets in total assets (IFATA), foreign ownership (a dummy indicating 
whether the firm is foreign-owned), lagged TFP to account for convergence effects (Barro (1998)), 
and sectoral dummies. As mentioned above, we also include two variables that capture the quality 
of financial market institutions: the EBRD index of banking sector reforms and stock market 
capitalization as a share of GDP. In order to minimize the potential endogeneity bias, if any, of our 
threshold estimates using current debt ratio, we also experiment with lagged and fitted leverage 
ratios and compare these alternative estimates (see further discussion in section 3.6).  
Combining (3a) and (3b), we can write: 
 
 ΔTFPit+1 = β’ Xit +α1 Lit I(Lit ≤γ) + α2 Lit I(Lit >γ)+ νit                                    (4)  
 
I(.) is an indicator function, indicating whether the leverage of the i-th firm at time t is less than, 
equal to, or greater than the threshold parameter  . The errors νit are assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed with mean zero and finite variance. Depending on whether the actual 
leverage is smaller, equal to, or larger than the threshold value ( ) to be estimated, observations 
are divided into two “regimes” where the regimes are distinguished by different regression slopes, 
1 and 2 . Let Sn(β, α( )) represent the sum of squared errors for equation (4), where n is the 
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sample size. Given that the parameters α depend on the threshold parameter , we denote them by 
α( ). Because of this dependence, Sn(.) is not linear in the parameters but rather a step function 
where steps appear at some distinct values of the threshold variable  .  However, conditional on a 
given threshold value, say  = 0, Sn(.) is linear in β and α. Accordingly, Sn(β, α( 0)) can be 
minimised to yield the conditional OLS estimates βˆ( 0) and αˆ( 0). Among all possible values for 
the leverage threshold, the estimate of the threshold corresponds to that value of α, which 
minimises the sum of squared errors Sn(β,α( 0)) for  = 0. This minimisation problem is solved 
by a grid search over 393 leverage quantiles {1%, 1.25%, 1.50% … 98.75%, 99%}. Once the 
sample splitting value of   is identified, the estimates of the slope parameters are readily available. 
If a threshold is identified, i.e. α1 ≠ α2, one can form a confidence interval for the particular 
threshold value . This amounts to testing the following null hypothesis:  
H0: γ = γ0 
Under the normality assumption, the likelihood ratio test statistic is routinely used in standard 
econometric applications to test for particular parametric values. But Hansen (2000) shows that 
LRn(γ) does not have a standard chi-square distribution in the threshold model. The correct 
distribution function and the appropriate asymptotic critical values need to be obtained from the 
bootstrapped standard errors (see Girma (2005) for further details).  
 
On the basis of the trade-off theory of capital structure, we expect a single threshold, which is 
equivalent to an optimal level of leverage where TFP growth is maximized. However, the 
confidence interval around the point estimate allows us to identify three bands of leverage. Suppose 
that the limits of the confidence interval around γ0 are given by  1 (lower limit) and  2 (upper 
limit). The first band corresponds to a leverage ratio below the lower limit (i.e. leverage ≤  1), 
the second to an intermediate leverage ratio (i.e.  1< leverage ≤ 2), and the third to “excessive” 
leverage (i.e. leverage > 2). Accordingly, we modify equation (4) as follows 
 
ΔTFPit+1 = α1 Lit I(Lit ≤γ1) + α2 Lit I( 1<Lit ≤ 2) +α3 Lit I(Lit > 2)+ β’ Xit +νit                      (5) 
         
The final step in our estimation strategy is to establish the asymptotic distribution of the slope 
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coefficients. Although these parameters depend on the estimated threshold limits  1 and  2, 
Hansen (2000) demonstrates that this dependence is not of first-order asymptotic importance. 
Consequently, the usual distribution theory (i.e. asymptotically normal) can be applied to the 
estimated slope coefficients so that one can use the asymptotic p-values to test whether there is a 
significant threshold effect, i.e. whether α1= α2= α3=0. Rejection of this null hypothesis would 
confirm the presence of a significant threshold effect11. 
 
3.3. Baseline threshold estimates 
 
The threshold estimates of model (5) are summarized in Tables 4 and 5 for all firms and non-zero 
debt firms respectively. The tables report the coefficient estimates for all the explanatory variables 
(except sectoral dummies), including the slope coefficients for the three bands of leverage 
identified by the 95% confidence interval around the threshold (we also show the corresponding 
point estimates). Despite some variation depending on the sample and the measure of leverage, the 
confidence interval estimates seem quite robust. The upper threshold limits are 0.386 for the debt 
ratio and 0.403 for the liability ratio for all firms. For indebted firms, the corresponding ratios are 
0.397 and 0.429 for the debt and liability ratios respectively. The initial value of TFP is 
insignificant, indicating the absence of convergence effects.  
[Insert Tables 4 and 5 here] 
 
Although average observed TLTA is higher than average observed TDTA (see Table 1), the upper 
threshold level for the liability ratio is only slightly higher than that for the debt ratio. This result 
suggests that non-bank liabilities, of which trade credit constitutes a large part, do not significantly 
contribute to productivity growth in our sample countries. There is a debate in the literature 
regarding the impact of trade credit on productivity in transition countries. On the one hand, 
Schaffer (1998) argues that the use of trade credit may soften the budget constraint and therefore 
delay or prevent the efficient restructuring of companies in transition countries. By contrast, 
Coricelli (1996) argues that trade credit favours growth by providing access to private credit 
markets to newly established firms in the region. The positive and negative effects of trade credit 
                                                 
11 This procedure is explained in detail in and Girma (2005) and Henry et al. (2012)).   
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on productivity may offset each other, at least to some extent, so that the net effect of trade credit 
on productivity growth is small in our sample. 
 
More importantly, the slope coefficients for the three endogenously identified bands of leverage are 
all significant, irrespective of the sample and measure of leverage used. The slope coefficients 
provide evidence that moderate leverage (leverage ≤ 2) boosts TFP growth (α1and α2 are positive), 
while excessive leverage (leverage> 2) lowers it (α3 is negative), after controlling for firm-level, 
sector and market characteristics. The marginal effect of leverage on TFP growth decreases as 
leverage increases from the lower band through the intermediate one to the upper band where the 
effect finally becomes negative. In other words, at low levels of leverage an increase in leverage has 
a large positive impact on TFP growth. This impact diminishes as leverage increases and ultimately 
turns negative. Based on the estimates of Table 5, a firm with a debt ratio (liability ratio) of 0.2 (i.e. 
below the lower threshold), for example, reaps net benefits from leverage in the form of 4.24% 
(10.13%) extra TFP growth compared with an unlevered firm. For a firm with a debt ratio 
(liability ratio) of 0.37 (in the mid-range), the net benefits amount to 3.14% (3.73%) of extra TFP 
growth. Finally, a firm with a debt ratio (liability ratio) of 0.5 (i.e. an overlevered firm) has 
negative net benefits amounting to 23.56% (17.96%) of forgone TFP growth compared with an 
unlevered firm.  
 
Clearly leverage is not the only factor affecting TFP growth. Among the firm-specific factors, firm 
size, share of intangible assets and ownership are significant determinants of TFP growth. In 
general, TFP growth is significantly higher for small and medium sized firms, foreign firms (this is 
significant at 10% level for indebted firms only) and firms with large intangible assets. The role of 
institutional factors is also worth highlighting here. A higher efficiency of the banking sector (as 
captured by a higher index of banking sector reforms) significantly increases TFP growth. The 
marginal effect of banking sector reforms is about 10% for all firms and 5-6% for indebted firms. In 
comparison, the marginal effect of market capitalization is small (about 1% for both samples), but 
positive and statistically significant too. These estimates confirm the beneficial role of better 
financial institutions on TFP growth in our sample.  
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Since our conceptual starting point is the trade-off theory, we attempted to check for its relevance 
in our sample. However, we were unable to investigate the relationship between market-based 
measures of leverage and firm value or the cost of capital due to lack of data. Instead, we examine 
whether a non-linear relationship exists between book leverage and alternative measures of firm 
value. Since earnings growth is a primary determinant of equity value12, we consider two proxies 
for firm value based on earnings, namely return on assets (ROA, defined as the EBIT/total assets) 
and return on equity (ROE, defined as EBIT/book equity)13. The results are shown in Table 6. 
They support the existence of a leverage level that maximizes ROA as well as ROE.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Bearing in mind the fact that our results are not a formal test of the trade-off theory due to data 
issues, this suggests that the optimal leverage level from a firm-value perspective is higher than the 
optimal level from a productivity perspective. This is likely due to the fact that value creation does 
not only result from productivity improvements but also increases in the capital base that supports 
earnings growth14. More importantly, the qualitative results are very similar. The thresholds exist 
and the effects of leverage within the three different bands are as for TFP growth: first positive and 
large, then positive but small, and finally negative. Again bearing in mind the caveats of our 
analysis, these results can add value to the study of capital structure. In particular, it would be 
interesting to apply our approach to a sample of firms for which market values are available (e.g. 
US data). 
 
 
3.4. Firm characteristics and optimal leverage 
 
We test the robustness of our estimates by splitting the sample between more and less profitable 
firms and subsequently focusing on a subsample of large firms. In addition to confirming the 
robustness of the threshold, these robustness checks allow us to investigate the relationship 
                                                 
12 Examples of valuation models which incorporate earnings growth are Campbell and Shiller (2001) and Fama and 
French (2002b). 
13 The availability and quality of data on the book value of equity is limited. We had to exclude about 15% of 
observations as outliers for the threshold model to converge. 
14 The upper threshold level of leverage is smaller for ROE than for ROA. However, given the limited availability and 
quality of equity data, we refrain from drawing quantitative conclusions from this result. 
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between optimal leverage and firm characteristics. The trade-off theory predicts a positive relation 
between optimal leverage and profitability. An increase in earnings increases the tax advantage to 
debt and reduces the expected costs of distress and bankruptcy, and hence results in an increase in 
leverage (Strebulaev (2007)). In addition, the trade-off theory predicts a negative relation between 
optimal leverage and size (e.g. Kurshev and Strebulaev (2006)). However, previous studies using 
cross-sectional or panel regressions tend to find a negative (positive) relation between profitability 
and leverage (size) (see e.g. Frank and Goyal (2009)). These conflicting results may be driven by 
the fact that studies typically rely on the implicit assumption that firms are always at their optimal 
level of capital structures. By contrast, the threshold model allows us to determine optimal leverage 
despite firms’ temporary deviations from the optimum and may therefore enable us to examine the 
empirical validity of the theoretical relationships. 
 
We use two alternative measures of profitability, namely, a firm’s return on assets (ROA, defined 
as EBIT/total assets) and return on capital employed (ROCE15). We split the sample based on the 
median values of those two profitability measures, i.e. a less (more) profitable firm is defined as 
one with a profit margin or ROCE below (above) the median ROA or ROCE (approx. 0.04 for 
both measures). The threshold estimates for more and less profitable firms (indebted firms only) 
are presented in Table 7.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
These estimates confirm the significant adverse effect of excessive leverage (beyond the upper 
threshold limit) on TFP growth and the positive benefits to leverage below that point. Interestingly, 
the estimated threshold parameters differ significantly for more or less profitable firms. The upper 
and lower threshold values of the debt and liability ratios are significantly higher for more profitable 
firms. For example, the upper (lower) threshold limit is approximately 60% (47%) for more 
profitable firms as opposed to approximately 30% (20%) for less profitable firms when profitability 
is measured by the profit margin. Similarly, the point estimates of leverage threshold is higher for 
more profitable firms irrespective of the measure chosen. In addition, Table 7 shows that the 
negative effect of excessive leverage on TFP growth is significantly higher in absolute value for less 
                                                 
15 ROCE as reported in the Orbis data base. 
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profitable firms. In other words, more profitable firms are able to sustain significantly higher level 
of debts without hurting their productivity growth. The latter may highlight the higher cash flows 
of more profitable firms, which are taken into account in the trade-off theory. This suggests a 
positive relationship between profitability and optimal leverage. Bearing in mind that this result is 
not a formal test of the trade-off theory, the conclusion is nevertheless qualitatively similar to the 
theoretical prediction of the trade-off theory and the empirical results of Korteweg (2010). 
Previous studies using cross-sectional or panel regressions tend to find a negative relation between 
profitability and leverage (see e.g. Frank and Goyal (2009)). This is because high profits 
mechanically lower observed leverage ratios and previous studies rely on the implicit assumption 
that firms are always optimally levered. Strebulaev (2007) shows formally that cross-sectional 
regressions will produce misleading results on the relation between leverage and profitability. 
Specifically, he shows that even if firms in simulated economies follow the prescriptions of the 
dynamic trade-off theory, higher profitability lowers the current leverage of a firm unless it 
refinances in that period. Hence, the presence of frictions that result in firms diverging from their 
optimal capital structures may complicate empirical work on the trade-off theory. By contrast, the 
threshold model allows us to determine optimal leverage despite firms’ temporary deviations from 
the optimum. 
 
Finally, we focus on the subsample of relatively larger firms, defined as firms with total assets above 
the sample median (see Table 10). Again, we restrict our attention to non-zero debt firms. The 
confidence interval for the debt ratio is 0.263-0.44616, against 0.312-0.397 for all non-zero debt 
firms. As before, there is evidence that TFP falls if the leverage is above the upper threshold limit 
and this holds not only for larger firms, but also for all firms taken together. More interestingly, the 
point estimate of leverage threshold is 0.355 for larger firms (as against 0.361 for all firms taken 
together). In other words, there is evidence from our sample that the threshold level of leverage 
(beyond which productivity deteriorates) is somewhat smaller for larger firms than that for all 
firms. This is consistent with available empirical evidence that not only will larger firms be likely to 
have more debt, but also the marginal benefit of this debt is likely to be lower. This is an argument 
that goes back to the work of Titman and Wessels (1988) in a static framework and is also 
                                                 
16 For brevity, we do not report the full results. There was no significant threshold for smaller firms, i.e. firms with 
total assets below the median.  
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consistent with the more recent work of Strebulaev (2007) in a dynamic setting.  As a result of this, 
one would expect that the threshold leverage for large firms to be smaller than all firms, as the 
beneficial effects of debt for firms who find it easy to raise debt, will be lower than for firms who 
find it more costly. Further, agency problems between firms and lenders are inherently different 
for large firms. Large firms are less likely to experience the constraints of long term debt, as banks 
are less likely to default, and more likely to be able to restructure debt rather than default (Gilson 
et al., 1990), such that the detrimental effects of debt on productivity will occur later for large 
firms than average. 
 
 
3.5. Incidence of excess leverage 
 
We use the leverage threshold estimates to calculate the percentage of firms above the upper 
threshold for the debt ratio (TDTA) in each of our sample countries. We obtain these estimates for 
all non-zero debt firms, but also for more and less profitable non-zero debt firms (where 
profitability is based on the profit margin). The results are summarized in Table 8.  
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
There is evidence of a significant proportion of firms in most of our sample countries with debt 
ratios in excess of the upper debt threshold. There is also pronounced inter-country variation: 
considering all non-zero debt firms, the proportion of firms with excessive leverage is the highest in 
Russia (above 20% of firms), closely followed by Bulgaria (about 19% of firms). In contrast, the 
proportion of non-zero debt firms with excessive leverage is the lowest in Hungary (little less than 
3%), closely followed by Slovakia (little above 3%). These results combined with the finding that 
many firms have zero leverage (see section 2.2) highlight the presence of a double puzzle, the 
puzzle of zero-leverage firms and the puzzle of overlevered firms.  In columns 2 and 3 of Table 8, 
we split the sample to focus on more and less profitable firms. The figures suggest that the 
proportion of firms with excessive leverage is higher among relatively less profitable firms in most 
sample countries. However, Korteweg (2010) finds that the degree of overleverage is higher for 
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low-profit firms in a US sample, so this may not be a phenomenon that is limited to transition 
countries. 
 
3.6. Robustness of threshold estimates 
 
One criticism of the Hansen (2000) approach is that the variable of interest is often subject to the 
decision making process of the firm, and is therefore endogenous. Hence, the threshold estimates 
may be biased or inconsistent. In order to check the robustness of our original estimates, we 
replace the current debt ratio by instrumental variables and re-estimate the threshold model.  
 
This methodology requires one to identify appropriate instruments, in this case variables that are 
correlated with the current debt ratio, but uncorrelated with current productivity growth. 
Typically the literature has resorted to employing lags to resolve endogeneity issues (e.g., see 
Arellano and Bond, 1991). Accordingly we replace the current debt ratio by its lag. In addition, we 
employ a two-stage method where we first obtain the fitted value of the current debt ratio using the 
standard cross-sectional approach (See equation (A2) in Appendix 217) and then replace the current 
debt ratio by its fitted value. 
 
Clearly, both lagged and fitted debt ratios are strongly correlated with the actual debt ratios. In 
particular, the correlation between the current firm-level debt ratio and its lagged value is 0.2188 
while that between current debt ratio and fitted debt ratio is 0.8091. In addition, both lagged and 
fitted debt ratios are uncorrelated with the error term in the TFP growth equation. This can be 
seen from the low correlation between these alternative leverage measures and the estimated error 
from the TFP growth equation (5). In particular, the correlation between the lagged debt ratio and 
the estimated residual is 0.035 and the correlation between the fitted debt ratio and the residual is 
0.0945 in the sample of all firms.  
 
These alternative threshold estimates for the debt ratio (TDTA) are summarised in Table 9 for all 
                                                 
17 Note that the variables that explain the debt ratio in equation (A2) are not exactly the same as those determining TFP 
growth in equation (5). In particular, the log of total assets and the inflation rate are included in equation (A2), but not 
in equation (5). In addition, equation (5) includes initial TFP and also different bands of leverage depending on the two 
threshold limits obtained from the estimation of the threshold model. See further discussion in Appendix 2. 
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firms and indebted firms. Again they confirm the non-linear effects of leverage on TFP growth: 
while moderate leverage boosts productivity growth, excessive leverage (beyond the upper 
threshold limit) hampers productivity growth. The estimated confidence interval for lagged debt 
ratio is 0.326-0.407 for all firms and 0.366-0.437 for indebted firms. Similar threshold estimates 
are obtained when we replace current debt ratio by its fitted value. These are 0.339-0.419 and 
0.357-0.431 respectively for all firms and all indebted firms. The corresponding estimates from the 
original threshold model were 0.330-0.386 and 0.312-0.397 respectively for all firms and indebted 
firms. In other words, these alternative threshold estimates for debt ratio for all firms and all 
indebted firms are within less than 5 percentage points of the estimates (0.386 and 0.397) using 
current debt ratio. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
When leverage is instrumented using lagged leverage (fitted leverage), ceteris paribus, a firm with a 
debt ratio of 0.2 (i.e. below the lower threshold) reaps net benefits from leverage in the form of 
13.1% (12.1%) extra TFP growth compared with an unlevered firm. For a firm with a debt ratio of 
0.37 (in the mid-range), the net benefits amount to 2.5% (3.23%) of extra TFP growth. Finally, a 
firm with a debt ratio of 0.5 (i.e. an over-levered firm) has negative net benefits amounting to 
15.2% (16%) of forgone TFP growth compared with an unlevered firm.  
 
Table 10 provides an overview of all the debt ratio threshold estimates (both interval and point 
estimates) that we have obtained so far. All the results point to the existence of a non-linear 
relationship between leverage and TFP growth. The presence of a single threshold in each case is 
compatible with the theory of optimal capital structure, where the threshold is associated with 
maximum TFP growth. The estimates are robust to alternative leverage measures used in our 
analysis.  The threshold estimates vary somewhat with firm characteristics, in particular profitability 
and size, in a way consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure.  
  
3.7.  Threshold estimates for 2000-2006 
 
Given that the sample period 1999-2008 includes two crises, namely the Russian crisis of 1998-99 
21 
 
 
and the recent financial crisis of 2007, which both had an impact on the CEE region, we estimate 
the threshold model for the subsample of “normal years” 2000-2006. The estimates for 2000-2006 
are summarized in Table 10.  
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
2000-2006 threshold estimates appear to be in line with those for the full sample 1999-2008 
irrespective of whether we consider all firms or only indebted firms. For example, the lower 
threshold estimate is 0.336 in the full sample of all firms as opposed to 0.342 in the corresponding 
2000-2006 sample. Similarly, the estimate of the upper threshold is 0.386 in the full sample of all 
firms compared to 0.377 in the 2000-2006 sample. In conclusion, the results do not appear to be 
driven by the choice of sample period.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The paper aims to bridge the gap between the literature on optimal capital structure and the wider 
macroeconomic literature on finance-growth nexus. On the basis of the trade-off theory of capital 
structure, we posit a non-monotonic relationship between leverage and productivity growth at the 
firm level. TFP growth is not only the most important metric in the macroeconomic growth 
literature; it has attracted increasing interest from the finance literature. We provide evidence 
supporting our hypothesis using a threshold regression model (Hansen, 2000). Estimates for a 
sample of Central and Eastern European countries confirm that TFP growth increases with book 
leverage until the latter reaches a critical threshold beyond which leverage becomes “excessive” and 
lowers TFP growth. This result points to the existence of an optimal leverage ratio where the net 
benefits of debt in terms of productivity gains are exhausted. Despite some variation depending on 
the sample and the measure of leverage, the estimates seem quite robust. The estimates of the slope 
coefficients for the three bands of leverage (low, intermediate and excessive) suggest that the 
productivity gains (costs) to leverage are substantial for underlevered (overlevered) firms. Book 
leverage is found to have similar non-monotonic effects on return on assets and return on equity.  
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Due to data limitations, our results are not a formal test of the trade-off theory. However, they 
suggest that the threshold regression approach is a promising methodology for the study of optimal 
capital structure and how the latter varies with firm characteristics. In contrast to existing empirical 
evidence based on observed leverage ratios, the threshold model allows us to endogenously 
determine optimal leverage despite firms’ temporary deviations from the optimum. Our results 
highlight a positive (negative) relationship between profitability (size) and optimal leverage, unlike 
existing studies that use traditional cross-sectional or panel regressions. 
 
Using the leverage threshold estimates, we find evidence of a significant proportion of firms with 
debt ratios in excess of the upper debt threshold in our sample. Our results suggest that the 
proportion of firms with excessive leverage is higher among relatively less profitable firms in most 
sample countries. Korteweg (2010) finds that the degree of overleverage is higher for low-profit 
firms in a US sample, so this may not be a phenomenon that is limited to transition countries alone. 
 
Finally, we confirm the robustness of our estimates by using two instruments for the debt ratio, 
namely the lagged debt ratio and a fitted value of the debt ratio. Our results suggest that the 
baseline estimates only slightly underestimate the upper thresholds. Our results are also robust to 
the exclusion from our sample of two crisis episodes that significantly affected the CEE region.  
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Table 1: Cross-country variation in leverage 1999-2008 
          All firms   
Non-zero 
debt firms 
     TLTA  TDTA  TLTA TDTA 
Country Firms 
Total 
obs. 
Zero 
debt 
(%) 
Missing 
debt 
(%)  
Mean SD Mean SD       
Mean 
Mean 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 146 1362 19.5 20.7 0.36 0.27 0.11 0.14 0.38 0.13 
Bulgaria 232 2034 16.7 27.6 0.42 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.45 0.17 
Croatia 135 1264 5.8 87.7 0.39 0.23 0.08 0.14 0.42 0.14 
Czech Republic 71 642 10.7 38.3 0.41 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.44 0.15 
Estonia 10 94 2.1 40.4 0.40 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.45 0.17 
Hungary 22 203 8.9 53.2 0.39 0.18 0.10 0.12 0.39 0.12 
Latvia 26 239 12.1 34.3 0.45 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.52 0.25 
Lithuania 30 281 3.2 49.1 0.46 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.48 0.21 
Poland 159 1467 16.4 52.1 0.47 0.19 0.10 0.13 0.52 0.15 
Republic of Moldova 195 1806 21.0 46.5 0.33 0.25 0.11 0.17 0.43 0.19 
Romania 236 2062 44.9 26.8 0.47 0.23 0.05 0.10 0.52 0.12 
Russian Federation 656 6021 15.4 34.5 0.46 0.25 0.15 0.18 0.50 0.20 
Serbia 742 6925 15.1 13.2 0.40 0.26 0.12 0.16 0.42 0.15 
Slovak Republic 124 1137 5.7 33.0 0.44 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.45 0.13 
Slovenia 56 526 1.3 78.9 0.40 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.43 0.19 
Ukraine 391 1443 17.1 2.6 0.42 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.45 0.17 
  All 3231 27506 16.9 31.1 0.42 0.25 0.12 0.16 0.45 0.16 
 
  
Note: TLTA is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and TDTA is the ratio of total debt (both short and long-run) to total assets.  
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Table 2: Distribution of debt among firms with positive debt 1999-2008 in our sample 
  Leverage percentiles Average leverage by size  
Country 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% Small Large 
Corr(size, 
leverage) 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.03 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.42 0.61 0.11 0.12 0.02 
Bulgaria 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.42 0.51 0.68 0.08 0.19 0.13 
Croatia 0.03 0.11 0.19 0.33 0.46 0.89 0.04 0.15 0.20 
Czech Republic 0.04 0.12 0.21 0.32 0.39 0.62 0.11 0.13 0.02 
Estonia 0.02 0.18 0.28 0.36 0.44 0.48 0.16 0.20 0.09 
Hungary 0.01 0.07 0.17 0.29 0.44 0.54 0.09 0.10 0.01 
Latvia 0.07 0.19 0.35 0.62 0.71 0.85 0.22 0.15 -0.17 
Lithuania 0.07 0.19 0.32 0.45 0.53 0.66 0.20 0.20 0.05 
Poland 0.05 0.12 0.22 0.33 0.40 0.59 0.11 0.11 0.03 
Republic of Moldova 0.04 0.13 0.30 0.46 0.56 0.72 0.06 0.18 0.21 
Romania 0.04 0.08 0.17 0.28 0.34 0.55 0.04 0.06 0.12 
Russian Federation 0.05 0.13 0.29 0.47 0.58 0.75 0.14 0.17 0.01 
Serbia 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.38 0.49 0.69 0.09 0.17 0.17 
Slovak Republic 0.04 0.10 0.18 0.29 0.35 0.58 0.10 0.16 -0.01 
Slovenia 0.05 0.16 0.32 0.42 0.47 0.73 0.21 0.18 -0.13 
Ukraine 0.03 0.11 0.25 0.41 0.51 0.71 0.13 0.12 -0.01 
Note: Size is measured by total assets. “Small firms” are defined as firms in the first two quartiles of the distribution of total assets.  
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Table 3: Quality of Financial Institutions, 1999-2008 
Country Stock market capitalization Banking reform index 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
44.54 2.53 
Bulgaria 15.74 3.38 
Croatia 32.62 3.70 
Czech 
Republic 
23.97 3.74 
Estonia 30.03 3.85 
Hungary 25.10 4.00 
Latvia 9.40 3.58 
Lithuania 18.18 3.34 
Poland 23.87 3.46 
Moldova 26.92 2.56 
Romania 13.04 2.91 
Russia 59.49 2.15 
Serbia 23.21 2.09 
Slovakia 7.09 3.41 
Slovenia 26.17 3.30 
Ukraine 21.54 2.46 
All 31.08 2.65 
 
Note: Banking reform index: Average EBRD index of banking sector reform (1 to 4.3, with a higher number indicating a better score); Stock market 
capitalization: Average stock market capitalization in per cent of GDP. Source: EBRD 
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Table 4:  Threshold estimates for total factor productivity growth, all firms 
 (1) Debt ratio  (2) Liability ratio 
 
Variable 
Coefficient  
t-statistic 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
t-statistic 
Initial TFP 0.1094 0.8432 Initial TFP 0.1357 0.8421 
TDTA>0.386 -0.0247*** -3.4236 TLTA>0.403 -0.1676** -2.2951 
0.330≤TDTA≤0.386 0.0966*** 2.5993 0.339≤ TLTA≤0.403 0.0575** 2.0061 
TDTA<0.330 0.3249* 1.737 TLTA <0.339 0.3349** 2.4239 
Small/Medium 
firms 
0.1644*** 3.2732 Small/Medium 
firms 
0.1273*** 2.8871 
Young firms -0.0027 -0.0866 Young firms -0.0057 -0.1393 
Foreign firms 0.2965 1.4025 Foreign firms 0.3415 1.3094 
Intangible assets 0.2535*** 4.4287 Intangible assets 0.204*** 3.0401 
Bank Reform 0.0963** 2.383 Bank reform 0.0941*** 2.7301 
Market 
capitalization 
0.0085*** 3.7362 Market 
capitalization 
0.0095*** 4.0223 
Intercept 0.4183* 1.817 Intercept 0.4368 1.2236 
Sector dummies yes  Sector dummies Yes  
R-square 0.0395  R-square 0.0436  
95% CI for γ 0.330-0.386 
(point est.= 0.364) 
95% CI for γ 0.339-0.403 
(point est.=0.387) 
Observations 7276  Observations 7276  
Note: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1; γ is the threshold parameter for leverage (TDTA or TLTA). 
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Table 5:  Threshold estimates for total factor productivity growth, firms with outstanding debt > 0 
 
 
Variable 
(1)   Debt ratio  
 
Coefficient t-statistic 
 
 
 
Variable 
(2)    Liability ratio 
 
Coefficient t-statistic 
Initial TFP 0.1246 1.434 Initial TFP 0.1606 1.0525 
TDTA>0.397 -0.4711*** -4.4027 TLTA >0.429 -0.3591*** -4.1582 
0.312≤TDTA≤0.397 0.0848*** 4.0394 0.366≤ TLTA ≤0.429 0.1007** 2.2809 
TDTA<0.312 0.2121*** 3.9798 TLTA <0.366 0.5063*** 4.9196 
Small/Medium firms 0.2827*** 3.2036 Small/Medium firms 0.2183*** 3.7566 
Young firms -0.0184 -0.6056 Young firms -0.0104 -0.3224 
Foreign firms 0.4598* 1.7453 Foreign firms 0.4722* 1.8367 
Intangible assets 0.1461*** 3.0295 Intangible assets 0.1103*** 3.4344 
Bank reform 0.0584* 1.7651 Bank efficiency 0.0498** 2.2909 
Market capitalization 0.0144* 1.9062 Market capitalization 0.0079*** 4.508 
Intercept 0.3079 1.4412 Intercept 0.2503 0.5869 
Sector dummies Yes  Sector dummies Yes  
R-square 0.038  R-square 0.0609  
95% CI for γ 
0.312-0.397 
(point est. = 0.368) 95% CI for γ2 
0.366-0.429 
(point est. =0.391) 
Observations 7276  7276 
Note: *** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. γ is the threshold parameter for leverage (TDTA or TLTA). 
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Table 6. Threshold estimates of ROA and ROE for indebted firms 
 
Dependent variable: ROA Using debt ratio  Using liability ratio 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
TDTA>0.629 -0.07611 -10.103** TLTA >0.578 -0.0196 -2.989 ** 
0.271≤TDTA ≤0.629 0.0686 0.4048 0.246≤TLTA ≤0.58 0.0887 9.754 ** 
TDTA <0.271 0.044559 1.7081* TLTA<0.246 0.4319 11.563 ** 
Other control variables Yes Yes Other control variables Yes Yes 
 
95% CI for γ 
0.271 -0.629 (point 
est.=0.458) 95% CI for γ 
0.246-0.578 (point est. = 
0.406) 
Dependent variable:ROE Using debt ratio  Using liability ratio 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
TDTA>0.629 -0.0835 -3.014** TLTA >0.601 -0.0676 -1.555** 
0.326≤TDTA ≤0.582 0.1312 2.668** 0.331≤TLTA ≤0.601 0.0196 1.634** 
TDTA <0.271 0.1473 2.812** TLTA<0.331 0.0611 2.461** 
Other control variables Yes Yes Other control variables Yes Yes 
 
95% CI for γ 
0.326 -0.582 
(point est.=0.469) 95% CI for γ 
0.331-0.601 
(point est.= 499) 
Note: *** p-value< 0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1. γ is the threshold parameter for leverage (TDTA or TLTA). 
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Table 7: Threshold estimates for TFP growth for profitable and non-profitable firms (indebted firms only) 
  profit margin < 0.04 profit margin > 0.04 ROCE < 0.04 ROCE > 0.04 
         
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Initial TFP 0.0282 0.1882 0.2513 0.8998 0.0111 0.0785 0.2218 1.0221 
TDTA > γ2 -0.5383*** -2.871 -0.0205*** -3.7415 -0.6522*** -3.1142 -0.1924** -2.5415 
γ1 ≤ TDTA≤ γ2 0.7244** 2.4022 0.074* 1.8906 -0.0035 -0.0122 0.1114*** 2.9813 
TDTA< γ1 0.297*** 3.4799 0.1978* 1.7339 0.5892** 2.2228 0.1943* 1.7429 
Small/medium firms 0.0851 0.9762 0.1994*** 3.2601 0.0995*** 2.9089 0.0998** 2.4722 
Young firms -0.2595** -2.1802 0.0105 0.1656 -0.1512** -2.0046 0.0091 0.1824 
Foreign firms 0.1295 0.4785 0.61** 2.2618 0.1606 0.6445 0.6175*** 2.9946 
Intangible assets 0.1692*** 3.0924 0.2001*** 2.6732 0.0977*** 3.0465 0.3336*** 4.4063 
Bank efficiency 0.2476*** 2.8049 0.0343 1.471 0.2102 1.4692 0.0243 1.0896 
Market capitalization 0.0123 1.3506 0.0108*** 3.7178 0.0075 0.7625 0.0066*** 4.5869 
Sector dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Intercept -0.4456 -0.6346 0.5858 1.4961 -0.3274 -0.357 0.3975 1.0763 
R-square 0.0543  0.059  0.06  0.076  
95% CI for γ 0.207-0.314 
(point est. = 0.266) 
0.469-0.601 
(point est.= 0.520) 
0.337-0.502 
(point est. = 0.411) 
0.477-0.695 
(point est.= 0.578) 
Note: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1; γ1  , γ2 are respectively the lower and upper confidence limits for leverage. See  
page 16 for definitions of profit margin and return of capital employed (ROCE).  
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Table 8: Distribution of firms above the upper threshold limits 
 Non-zero debt firms 
 All firms Profitable firms Non-profitable firms 
  
(by profit 
margin) 
(by profit margin) 
 
Debt ratio γ2> 
0.399 
Debt ratio γ2> 
0.577 
Debt ratio γ2>0.301 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.1519 0.0146 0.0467 
Bulgaria 0.1886 0.0204 0.0856 
Croatia 0.1042 0.0127 0.0540 
Czech Republic 0.1088 0.0107 0.0565 
Estonia 0.0841 0.0144 0.0456 
Hungary 0.0290 0.0004 0.0145 
Latvia 0.1276 0.0082 0.1152 
Lithuania 0.1119 0.0198 0.0263 
Poland 0.0625 0.0069 0.0104 
Republic of Moldova 0.0875 0.0004 0.0875 
Romania 0.1129 0.0090 0.0063 
Russian Federation 0.2008 0.0515 0.0448 
Serbia 0.1014 0.0074 0.0713 
Slovakia 0.0322 0.0092 0.0115 
Slovenia 0.0934 0.0083 0.0603 
Ukraine 0.0830 0.0102 0.0462 
 Note: γ2 is upper confidence limit for leverage. 
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Table 9:  Threshold estimates using alternative debt ratios 
 All firms Firms with debt > 0 
 lagged debt Fitted debt lagged debt Fitted debt 
Variable coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat coeff t-stat 
Initial TFP 0.25159 14.720*** 0.2207 11.867*** 0.1021 0.786 0.1392 0.8186
TDTA > γ2 ‐0.44552 ‐1.959** ‐0.4898 ‐2.366*** ‐0.3033 ‐6.342*** ‐0.3181 ‐6.393***
γ1 ≤ TDTA≤ γ2 0.486717 3.868*** 0.4755 3.590*** 0.0675 2.906*** 0.0875 3.414***
TDTA< γ1 1.030365 4.933*** 1.0161 4.621*** 0.6554 2.351*** 0.6039 3.174***
Small/Medium 
firms 
‐0.18087 ‐5.48*** ‐0.1759 ‐4.910*** 0.1062 4.255*** 0.1645 3.245***
Young firms ‐0.07179 ‐1.781* ‐0.0793 ‐1.895* ‐0.0274 ‐0.5310 ‐0.0278 ‐0.474
Foreign firms 0.023277 0.664 0.0222 0.6134 0.3048 1.3246 0.4695 1.459
Intangible assets 0.504725 1.645 0.5821 1.750* 2.3119 4.554*** 2.3388 4.075***
Bank reform 0.570564 11.595 0.6247 10.247*** 0.0478 1.782* 0.0662 1.1439
Market capital ‐0.00079 ‐0.645 ‐0.0007 ‐0.5376 0.0076 4.858*** 0.0091 4.416***
Intercept ‐0.3853 ‐2.192** ‐0.4729 ‐2.534*** 0.2694 0.6791 0.3919 0.7168
Sector dummies Yes  Yes  yes  yes  
R-square 0.033  0.031  0.045  0.036  
95% CI for γ 
0.326-0.407  
(point est. = 0.354) 
0.339-0.419  
(point est. = 0.369) 
0.366-0.437  
(point est.= 0.394) 
0.357-0.431  
(point est. = 0.382) 
Note: *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.1; γ1  , γ2 are respectively the lower and upper confidence limits for leverage. 
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Table 10: A summary of threshold estimates 
 Debt ratio thresholds  
 Lower limit Upper limit Point est. 
All firms  0.336 0.386 0.368 
All firms (2000-2006) 0.342 0.377 0.364 
All firms (lagged debt ratio) 0.326 0.407 0.370 
All firms (fitted debt ratio) 0.339 0.419 0.372 
Non-zero-debt firms 0.312 0.397 0.359 
Non-zero-debt firms (2000-2006) 0.328 0.376 0.354 
Non-zero-debt firms (lagged debt ratio) 0.366  0.437 0.400 
Non-zero-debt firms (fitted debt ratio) 0.357 0.431 0.394 
Non-zero-debt firms 2000-06 (lagged debt ratio) 0.369 0.421 0.399 
Non-zero-debt firms 2000-06 (fitted debt ratio)  0.377 0.434 0.404 
 Non-zero debt firms only  
More profitable firms 0.469 0.601 0.537 
Less profitable firms 0.207 0.314 0.271 
More profitable firms(2000-2006) 0.472 0.599 0.538 
Less profitable firms(2000-2006) 0.248 0.301 0.273 
Large firms 0.263 0.446 0.360 
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Figure 1: Percentage changes in domestic credit in the CEE region 1998-2008 
 
 
Source: EBRD 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria Croatia
Czech Republic Estonia Hungary
Latvia Lithuania Poland
Republic of Moldova Romania Russian Federation
Serbia Slovakia Slovenia
Ukraine AVERAGE MIN
MAX
37 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
Calculation of TFP 
 
The approach for estimating TFP is based on the existing literature (see e.g., Griffith 1999). This essentially involves estimating the following 
production function: 
 
  (A1) 
 
where subscripts i, and t refer to firm and year; yit, kit, lit, and mit represent the logarithm of a firm’s output (sales) and the production inputs: capital 
(measured as the book value of fixed assets), labor (number of employees) and material costs respectively. We estimate it  from (A1) as TFP and 
then compute log(TFP). To deflate monetary values we use the consumer price index due to the lack of available industrial price deflators for many 
of our sample countries.  
 
One of the most common econometric problems with the estimation of TFP is endogeneity. Typically, the regressors will be correlated with the 
error term because firms change their factor inputs in the anticipation of TFP changes. If that is the case, then profit maximization implies that the 
realization of the error term is expected to influence the decision on factor inputs. Consequently the OLS estimates could be inconsistent. Therefore, 
we use the Levinsohn-Petrin correction. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) extend Olley and Pakes (1996) by using material inputs as a proxy to control 
for unobservable productivity shocks.  
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Appendix 2: Estimation of a fitted debt ratio 
Our approach is based on the existing literature, which identifies a number of firm-specific factors that determine corporate leverage (e.g. see Rajan 
and Zingales, 1995; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; Driffield and Pal, 2010). Following our discussion in section 2, we also include some country 
specific institutional variables, namely an index of banking sector reforms (that captures banking sector efficiency) and stock market capitalization as a 
share of GDP.  Accordingly, we estimate the following leverage equation for firm i in year t (t=1999… 2008): 
 
Leverageit = β0 + β1 log(assets)it-1 + β2 Ageit-1 +  β3 (Intangible Fixed Assets/Total Assets)it-1 + β5 (EBIT/Total Assets)it-1 + β6 Inflation it-1 + β7 (Bank efficiency) it-1 + 
β8 (Stock market capitalization) it-1 + β9 Industry Median Leveraget1+  νi + uit                                                                              
               (A2) 
 
where EBIT stands for earnings before interest and taxes, νi is a firm-specific fixed effect and uit is the error term
 18.  The firm-specific fixed effects 
account for various unobserved firm-specific factors that may also influence leverage. We use panel data fixed effects to estimate equation (A2), using 
both debt and liability ratios as alternative measures of leverage. In order to mitigate a potential simultaneity bias, we follow the general convention 
(e.g., see Driffield and Pal (2010)) and use (one year) lagged explanatory variables. For simultaneity to bias the estimates, all firms need to correctly 
predict productivity one year in advance, which we rule out. The fixed effects estimates are summarized in Table A1 below. In general, more 
profitable firms tend to have lower leverage. Foreign firms and firms in industries with higher median leverage tend to have higher leverage. The 
bank reform coefficient is positive but remains insignificant. The coefficient on stock market capitalization to GDP is however positive and significant 
for both measures of leverage, thus highlighting a leverage premium for firms operating in countries with better stock market development.   
                                                 
18 Note that we do not have data on market-to-book ratios. In alternative specifications, the growth of total assets was included and always found to be insignificant.  Fixed assets 
as a share of total assets are also excluded from (A2) because there could also be a problem of multicollinearity with the share of intangible fixed assets. 
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 Table A1: Determinants of Leverage: Fixed effects estimates of debt and liability ratios, 1999-2008 
VARIABLES Debt ratio Liability ratio 
Total assets 0.00170 -0.0133 
 (0.00360) (0.0131) 
Small/medium firms -0.0256*** -0.0105 
 (0.00579) (0.00918) 
Young firms 0.00103 -0.000113 
 (0.00122) (0.00240) 
Foreign 0.0736*** 0.107*** 
 (0.00677) (0.0178) 
Median debt  0.257***  
 (0.0593)  
Median liability  0.189* 
  (0.103) 
Share of intangible assets 0.0501 -0.110 
 (0.0339) (0.0694) 
Profitability -0.0535** -0.166*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0479) 
Inflation -0.000343 -0.00368*** 
 (0.000224) (0.000883) 
Market capitalization 0.000702*** 0.000869* 
 (0.000196) (0.000441) 
Banking reforms 0.00526 0.0217 
 (0.00750) (0.0332) 
Constant 0.0129 0.410** 
 (0.0747) (0.176) 
Observations 9310 10433 
R-squared 0.090 0.132 
Number of firms 2243 2379 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p-value<0.01, ** p-value<0.05, * p-value<0.  
